THIRD DIVISION
|
HEIRS OF JUAN GRIÑO, SR.
REPRESENTED BY REMEDIOS C. GRIÑO, Petitioners, - versus - DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 165073 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On
challenge via petition for certiorari are the October 17, 2003 Decision and the
June 21, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 73368, “Heirs
of Juan Griño, Sr. represented by Remedios C. Griño v. Department of Agrarian
Reform.”[1]
Juan
Griño, Sr. (Griño), now deceased, was the owner of a parcel of agricultural
land,
Griño
was also the owner of a 50-hectare parcel of land located in Barangay Tad-y,
Sara,
On
Griño’s
9.35 hectare land was placed under the coverage of PD 27 on account of which Certificates
of Land Transfer (CLTs) covering a portion thereof were issued in favor of his tenants
Marianito Gulmatico, Ludovico Hubero, Rodolfo Hubero, Placida Catahay and
Roberto Gula.
Griño later filed
in the early 80’s a letter-petition for the cancellation of the above-said
CLTs, contending that they were issued to the tenants without giving him an
opportunity to be heard; the land was
the only riceland he had in the Municipality of Leganes; the area planted with palay was only a
little over 6 hectares; the land had a
very great sentimental value to him; and several of his children and
grandchildren who had no suitable residential lots might need the land to build
their homes.
In lieu of the
land covered by the CLTs, Griño offered seven hectares for each of the tenants
from his above-said 50-hectare land.[3]
Griño,
however, later ceded to the DBP his 50-hectare land via dacion en pago to
settle his obligation to it.
On
On
DAR Regional
Director Antonio S. Maraya, acting on the petition of Griño for the cancellation
of the CLTs, dismissed the same by Order[6] of
Based
from the foregoing, Atty. Rex Tupas, then Legal Officer III, Agrarian Reform
Team, Leganes, Iloilo recommended in his report dated April 5, 1982 the
dismissal of herein petition of Juan Griño for lack of merit and the
maintenance of the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of the above
enumerated tenants covering the subject farmholdings, the petitioner, Juan
Griño, being an owner of fifty hectares untenanted other agricultural lands which
will not entitle him for exemption/retention pursuant to LOI 474, as
implemented by MAR Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978. This
recommendation was concurred in by the Regional Director, Department of
Agrarian Reform, Region VI,
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition filed by Juan Griño for the
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of his
tenants covering certain parcels of land situated at Brgy. Gua-an,
The Land Bank
of the Philippines later advised Griño’s heirs, herein petitioners, by letter[9] of
June 6, 1996, of the DAR’s submission of Griño’s 9.35
hectare land transfer claim for payment under PD 27, its approval on June 5,
1996, and the requirements for the proceeds of the claim to be released.
Petitioners
later filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for retention[10] dated
SECTION 6. Retention Limits. – Except
as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined
by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but
in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three
(3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age;
and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm:
Provided, that landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them
thereunder, Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners
sought the exemption of the 9.35 hectare land from the coverage of either PD 27
or the CARL, contending that Griño had seven children and if a landowner is entitled
to five hectares as retention limit, the remaining land of Griño would not be enough
for his children, the 50-hectare land of Griño having already been ceded to the
DBP.[11]
In
the meantime or on June 5 and 25, 1997, Emancipation Patents were issued in
favor of Griño’s above-named tenants.[12]
DAR Regional
Director Dominador B. Andres subsequently dismissed petitioners’ application
for retention, by Order[13]
dated
x
x x x
The
reckoning date for the application of Operation Land Transfer is October 21,
1972, the date of effectivity of P.D. 27, which is the law applicable in this
case, and not the date of effectivity of R.A. 6657 (June 15, 1988), which is
applicable here only in suppletory manner. By operation of law, as of
x
x x x[14] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners moved to reconsider[15]
the
Petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary, arguing that the
Regional Director erred in:
I.
. . .
NOT CANCELING RESPONDENTS’ [CLTs] WHICH WERE NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
ISSUED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION.
II.
. . .
HOLDING THAT GRIÑO DID NOT HAVE A RIGHT OF RETENTION/EXEMPTION OVER HIS
TENANTED AGRICULTURAL LAND (LOT 1505-B) BECAUSE HE OWNED 50 HECTARES OF
UNTENANTED OTHER AGRICULTURAL LAND IN SARA WHEN PD NO. 27 TOOK EFFECT.
III.
. . .
HOLDING THAT THE REVERSION OF THE 50-
IV.
. . .
NOT ALLOWING GRIÑO AND (LATER) HIS HEIRS THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE TO RETAIN HIS 9-HECTARE-
LOT 1505-B IN LEGANES, ILOILO, IN LIEU OF THE 50-HECTARE LAND IN SARA, ILOILO,
AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 6 O[F] RA 6657 WHICH WAS ALREADY THE LAW WHEN THE
APPEALED ORDERS WERE ISSUED.[17]
By
Order[18]
dated
x
x x x
The
fact that the 50-hectare property was mortgaged to the DBP in 1972 is of no
moment in relation to PD 27. The naked title of said property remained with
Juan Griño, Sr. and he was still the owner thereof when PD 27 took effect.
However,
we agree with herein applicants-appellants that the reversion of the 50-hectare
property to the DBP by way of dacion en pago in 1985 was not done in
circumvention of PD 27. Said property was untenanted coconut land, hence,
beyond the coverage of PD 27. However, said transaction merely confirmed the
fact that Juan Griño, Sr. was the owner of the 50-hectare property when PD
27 took effect on
Since
Juan Griño, Sr. cannot retain any portion of his tenanted riceland in
Applicants-appellants
next assert their right of retention and their right to choose the area to be
retained as provided in Section 6 of RA 6657.
The
contention is likewise without merit.
x
x x
The
. . . statement of the Supreme Court clearly indicates that a landowner who
failed to exercise his retention right of land under PD 27 may do so under RA
6657 provided he is qualified to do so under the regime of PD 27. Stated
differently, where a landowner is not entitled to retain land under PD 27, he
cannot avail of the right of retention over the same land under RA 6657.
In
the case at hand, it is established that Juan Griño, Sr. was not entitled to
exercise his retention right over subject property under PD 27. As such, he is
also not entitled to exercise said right under RA 6657. If Juan Griño, Sr. had
no retention rights under PD 27 and RA 6657, it follows that his heirs, who are
his successors-in-interest, cannot also exercise the same right under PD 27 and
RA 6657.
x
x x x (Underscoring supplied)[19]
Before the Court of Appeals to which petitioners elevated
the case via petition for review, it raised the following arguments:
1. Griño had the right to retain subject land,
because LOI 474 exempted from OLT landowners of ricelands who owned other
agricultural lands exceeding 7 hectares if they did not derive sufficient
income from the latter.
2. Petitioners had each inherited a 1.33 hectare
share of the subject land as of 1985, which was already way below the retention
limits of PD 27 and RA 6657.[20]
By
Decision[21] dated
x x x Juan Griño’s disputed land came within
the coverage of P.D. 27 because it is tenanted riceland.
Because P.D. 27 initially lacked implementing rules and regulations, there were
a lot of uncertainties at the start on how the transfer of ownership to
tenant-framers would operate. As the above outline of the major post-P.D. 27
developments showed, the government started with the landed estates and worked
its way down to seven hectares of tenanted rice and corn land by the time it
came out with LOI 474. What was certain at that point was that from the
combined application of P.D. 27 and LOI 474, Juan Griño, Sr. had no right of
retention because he owned 9 hectares of
tenanted riceland and 50 hectares of coconut land.
Thus, his tenants were given – in 1981, during the lifetime of Juan Griño,
Sr. – their Certificates of Land Transfers preparatory to the Emancipation
Patents they would receive if they can perfect their payments of their portion
of the covered riceland. Juan Griño, Sr. objected to
the issuance of the CLTs soon after. This was the status of Juan Griño, Sr.’s
retention rights when he died in 1985.
x
x x x
While
Juan Griño seasonably objected to the CLTs, the objection was simply a pending
remedial action passed on to the heirs. This remedial action lost its
efficacy for the heirs when the DAR dismissed the petition on
x
x x x
Additionally,
when the heirs of Juan Griño, Sr. filed their application for retention
under RA 6657 in 1997 they had to contend with an existing adverse ruling by
the DAR – the order of
The
estate and the individual heirs are likewise estopped by laches from
questioning the denial of Juan Griño, Sr.’s claim for retention. The denial was
made on September 25, 1989 and the heirs’ present petition, assuming
that it can be characterized as an attack on the denial of Juan Griño, Sr.’s
retention rights, was made only on March 17, 1997 or 7 ½ years later. At
this point, laches has set in, laches being “the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. x x
x
x
x x x
In
our view, allowing the heirs to resurrect the long entombed issue of retention
under the circumstances of this case would not only be a major setback for the
government’s agrarian reform program, but would be unjust as well to the
individual tenants-beneficiaries who are now full-pledged owners of the lands
they till. Any adverse ruling against the new owners would be doubly unjust
since they were never heard in this present petition.
x x x x[22] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Petitioners moved to reconsider the appellate court’s
decision upon the following arguments:
1. The Order of DAR Regional Director Maraya
dated September 1989
purportedly denying Juan Griño, Sr.’s petition for cancellation of CLTs appeared
only in 1998 – 6 months after the PARO had declared in the EPs issued in
1997 that no CLTs had been issued. Hence, the supposed Maraya Order upholding
said CLTs could not be held against herein Petitioners, as even the PARO did
not know of their existence (assuming they existed at all).
2. There was no substitution of heirs in
relation to the supposed Petition for Cancellations of CLTs, hence herein
Petitioners cannot be held bound by the DAR Regional Director’s Order dated
September 1989.
3. Addressing the Order to a dead person,
without showing that it was validly served upon any heir or representative,
does not constitute valid notice upon herein Petitioners.
4. A Petition for Cancellation of CLTs is not
tantamount to an Application for Retention. The issuance of CLTs is not a
bar to the Petitioner’s exercise of their Constitutionally-guaranteed right of
retention.
5. The case of Daez v. CA which also involves a
denial of a petition for cancellation of CLTs, shows that the right of
retention can still be exercised under RA 6657 after such denial.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
By
Resolution[24] dated
June 21, 2004, the appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, holding that, among other things, the issues raised therein
“were never raised in the proceedings below nor in their petition for review”;
and that “it is against all rules of procedural orderliness and fair play for
the petitioners to claim that [its] [d]ecision is wrong because the underlying
facts – stated in the petitioners’ Statement of Facts and submissions – are
incorrect or incomplete” and “[p]etitioners are in fact estopped . . . . from making
this claim after [it has] relied on their statements and submissions in
rendering [its] Decision.”
The
appellate court likewise held that the DAR could not be faulted if there was no
substitution of parties, for although the DARAB rules do not contain any
provision bearing on the death of a party, the Rules of Court makes it the duty
of counsel to inform the tribunal the fact of death of the party and the name
and address of his representative.
Furthermore,
the appellate court held that even without above-stated rule, “ordinary common
sense . . . dictate[s] that the heirs of
a deceased litigant cannot sleep on their duty to attend the estate of the
deceased” and “[s]ince no notification appears to have been undertaken by the
heirs, [it] find[s] no merit in petitioners’ claim that there was no
substitution of heirs and the denial of Griño’s petition for cancellation of
CLTs does not bind them.”
Hence,
the present petition for certiorari, petitioners faulting the appellate
court to have committed grave abuse of discretion:
In refusing to recognize [its] Constitutional
right of retention – as embodied in RA 6657 – which the Association of Small
Landowners case had already acknowledged by the time the Maraya Order was
supposedly issued[.]
In refusing to recognize these strange
discoveries of glaring irregularities – of facts gleaned from the DAR’s records
submitted to the Court and made available to herein Petitioners only after the
Petition for Review had been filed before the Court of Appeals[.]
In insisting that [they] had already lost [their]
right of retention because the Maraya Order had become final, despite the
PARO’s unequivocal certification at the back of each Emancipation Patent that
there were no CLTs issued, and the Maraya Order was conveniently “discovered”
within the DAR itself only in 1998[.][25]
The
proper remedy for petitioners to challenge the appellate court’s decision and
resolution was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or
before
It is well
settled, however, that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost
appeal. Certiorari lies only when there
is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Why the question being raised by
petitioners, i.e., whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of
discretion could not have been raised on appeal,[26]
no reason therefor has been advanced.
While this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the discretion
to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
especially if filed within the reglementary period under said Rule, it finds nothing
in the present case to warrant a liberal application of the Rules, no justification
having been proffered, as just stated, why the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period.[27]
Technicality aside, the petition just the same fails.
Petitioners fault the appellate court for ignoring the
“evidence” they discovered when they had the opportunity to examine the records
forwarded by the DAR to the appellate court – “that Griño was misled into
believing that [the] CLTs had been issued, when there were none, or that the [September
25, 1989] Maraya Order denying Griño’s petition for cancellation of [the] CLTs
was without legal effect – because the (1) CLTs were inexistent, (2) he was
dead by the time the Order was rendered, and the property had long passed on to
his heirs, and (3) the heirs were never notified of said order, and there is no
showing that it was sent even to Juan Griño, Sr.’s
address of record either.”
As the appellate court ruled, however, petitioners are guilty
of laches in their attempt to “resurrect the retention issue [seven and a half]
years after its denial was decreed and
came to finality.”
As the appellate court ruled too, the DAR cannot be faulted
if no substitution of parties took place when Griño died, it being the duty of
the heirs to attend to the estate of the deceased, which duty includes
notification to adjudicating tribunals the fact of death of the litigant.
At all events, these issues raised by petitioners, which
substantially reiterate those raised in their motion for reconsideration before
the appellate court, were as the appellate court observed, never raised in the
proceedings below nor in petitioners’ petition for review before said court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion and concurred in by Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Josefina Guevarra-Salonga.
[2] Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) records, pp. 12-11. (DAR records are paginated from pp. 210-1.
[3] DAR records, p. 24.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS No. 474
TO: The Secretary of the Agrarian Reform
WHEREAS, last year, I ordered that small landowners of tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of less than twenty-four hectares but above seven hectares shall retain not more than seven hectares of such lands except when they won other agricultural lands containing more than seven hectares or land used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes form which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families;
WHEREAS, the Department of Agrarian Reform found that in the course of implementing any directive there are many landowners of tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less who also own other agricultural lands containing more than seven hectares or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes where they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families;
WHEREAS, it is therefore necessary to cover said lands under the Land Transfer Program of the government to emancipate the tenant-farmers therein.
NOW,
THEREFORE, I FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
1. You shall under take to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas of lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.
2.
Landowners who may choose to be paid the cost of their
lands by the Land Banks of the
x x x x
[8] DAR records, p. 23.
[9] Court of Appeals (CA) rollo, pp. 37-38.
[10] DAR records, p. 100.
[11]
[12] Rollo, pp. 70-85.
[13] DAR records, pp. 122-118
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] CA rollo, pp. 14-17.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Rollo, pp. 12-13.
[26] Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000).
[27] The President, Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151280, June 10, 2004,
431 SCRA 682, 688 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra at 98.